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I. Introduction
Increased investment in schooling is often promoted as a key development strategy aimed at promoting economic growth. Most of the
micro evidence that has been used to support the importance of
schooling in augmenting incomes in low-income countries comes
mainly from data describing the returns to schooling for men (e.g.,
Psacharopoulos 1994). Given the relatively low rates of participation
by women in formal-sector labor markets in such countries, information on the potential contribution of women’s schooling to income
is less available and, where found, problematical to interpret because
of labor market selectivity. Advocates of development and poverty
reduction policies that emphasize investments in female schooling,
however, suggest that significant returns to women’s schooling are
to be found in the household sector, where the schooling of women
has important effects on the human capital of future generations
(World Bank 1991; United Nations Development Program 1996).
One argument of development strategists, in particular, is that
better-educated mothers are superior teachers in the home, so that
investments in women’s human capital complement those in schools
(e.g., Forum for African Women Educationalists 1995).
There are many estimates from low-income countries of a positive
relationship between maternal schooling and the human capital of
children that control for family characteristics such as income and
paternal schooling. However, an important alternative interpretation of this association, based on conceptions of households in which
individuals optimize and bargain, is that mothers with higher levels
of schooling have superior options outside the household that confer to them a greater command of resources within the household,
which they choose to allocate to children at higher levels than men
would (Folbre 1984, 1986; Thomas 1990; Haddad, Hoddinott, and
Alderman 1997). While this view is not incompatible with the hypothesis that schooling actually augments home skills for women, it
presupposes that women’s schooling has returns outside the household. More important, it implies that the expansion of options for
women in the labor market along with enhanced investments in
women’s schooling is necessary to achieve greater investments in
children. However, growth in female employment opportunities,
which may be difficult to effect via specific program interventions,
is not a necessary condition for achieving greater schooling investments if schooling enhances women’s productivity in the home production of human capital and there are returns to schooling men.1
1
Of course, the observed positive associations between the schooling of mothers
and that of their children admit to a number of other interpretations. More schooled
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In this paper we develop a model of household decision making
in order to assess empirically the contribution of maternal schooling
to investments in children’s schooling while taking into account the
roles of preferences for schooling in the home and in the marriage
market; the effects of schooling on home productivity, household
bargaining power, and the time costs of household activities; and
differential returns to schooling for men and women in the labor
market. The framework is applied to data describing the demand
for educated wives and household investments in schooling in rural
India before and during the ‘‘green revolution,’’ a time in which
the returns to men’s but not women’s schooling rose substantially
in the farming sector but the apparently limited role of women in
agricultural decision making or in rural formal-sector employment
activities remained unchanged.
The estimates indicate that the demand for schooled wives increased more rapidly in the areas of high agricultural growth despite
the absence of market returns to female schooling. Consistent with
the interpretation of this as derived demand for female schooling
as an input in the production of child schooling, estimates that exploit the extended structure of Indian households to reduce the influence of male preferences for schooling and wealth effects indicate
significantly higher levels of study hours among children with literate mothers. Finally, estimates of the determinants of dowry values
indicate that, consistent with the view that female literacy has a value
to men rather than providing an improved postmarriage bargaining
position for women, literate women command a premium in the
marriage market. These results thus suggest that increasing labor
market opportunities for women is not necessary to justify increased
investments in female schooling, which have payoffs even in settings
in which there is increased demand for schooling solely in maledominated occupations.
II. The Setting: Women and the Indian
Green Revolution
The green revolution in India began in the mid to late 1960s with
the importation of new, high-yielding seeds developed outside of
India that substantially augmented agricultural productivity and economic growth where soil and weather conditions within India were
women may contribute more income to the household, which may lead to increased
investments in child schooling even if all household incomes are pooled and schooling has no in-home productivity effects. Also, men with greater preferences for
schooling may marry women with higher levels of schooling and invest more heavily
in their children’s schooling.
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hospitable. Agricultural incomes rose fastest in those areas with the
most appropriate soil and climate characteristics and, within those
areas, among farmers who adopted the new seeds most rapidly and
most efficiently. Rosenzweig (1995) and Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996) have shown that the schooling of farmers played a key role
in the adoption of new seeds and in increasing the profitability of
the new seeds. In particular, there was a substantial increase in the
returns to primary, but not higher, schooling levels for farmers in
areas in which potential farm productivity rose fastest because of the
sustained supply of suitable new seeds with improved characteristics
over time.
Foster and Rosenzweig did not examine the role of women’s
schooling or its returns. However, as we show below, the direct contribution of women’s schooling to agricultural productivity appears
to have been minimal in the first 15 years after the introduction
of the new seeds. The early green revolution setting therefore has
potential for illuminating the home schooling production effect of
women’s schooling. We use data from the two surveys used by Foster
and Rosenzweig, which describe rural households across India over
the period 1968–82. The first data set, the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS), was initiated in the first years of the green revolution
and provides longitudinal information for a national sample of 4,118
households pertaining to the crop years 1968–69, 1969–70, and
1970–71 on the use of high-yielding seed varieties, household structure, schooling, income, and agricultural inputs and outputs. The
villages (250), districts (96), and states in which the households reside are also identified in the coded data, enabling identification of
spatial differentials in productivity growth.
In the crop year 1981–82, NCAER conducted a resurvey of the
1970–71 households, the Rural Economic Development Survey
(REDS), as well as a survey of newly formed households to obtain a
stratified representative sample of all Indian households in 1981–
82. These data thus provide panel information on a subset of the
original 1970–71 households covering the period 1971–82 and a second data set describing the rural population in India in 1982 based
on the same survey design as in the ARIS. A useful element of the
REDS data for the purpose of this analysis is detailed information
on the allocation of time, by season, of all women and children during the crop year 1981–82.
To assess the direct effects of women’s schooling in agricultural
production in the context of the green revolution, we modify and
reestimate the equation on new seed adoption in Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and the equation on farm profits in Rosenzweig (1995)
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TABLE 1
Relationship of Male and Female Schooling and Literacy to HYV
Adoption: Maximum Likelihood Logit Estimates, 1971

Variable

(1)

Any adult male with primary schooling
Any adult male literate

.846
(6.15)
⋅⋅⋅

Any adult female with primary schooling

⋅⋅⋅

Any adult female literate

⋅⋅⋅

Owned land area
⫺3

Farm equipment value (⫻10 )
Irrigation equipment value (⫻10⫺3)
IADP district
Agricultural extension service in village
Constant

.00370
(.67)
.113
(1.72)
.0531
(1.89)
.613
(2.47)
.167
(.77)
⫺1.59
(8.88)

(2)
.845
(6.23)
⋅⋅⋅
.00586
(.04)
⋅⋅⋅
.00371
(.67)
.113
(1.73)
.0531
(1.89)
.612
(2.46)
.167
(.77)
⫺1.59
(8.89)

(3)
.822
(5.83)
.0745
(.41)
.0789
(.40)
⫺.0907
(.49)
.00360
(.65)
.113
(1.73)
.0533
(1.89)
.615
(2.48)
.167
(.77)
⫺1.62
(7.81)

Note.—Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.

from the early ARIS data to include the schooling of adult women
in the household as well as the schooling of adult men. Table 1 reports, for a sample of 2,532 farm households residing in districts in
which at least one sample farmer was cultivating with high-yielding
varieties (HYV) of seeds, maximum likelihood logit estimates of the
relationship between the probability that a farm household ever
adopted the new HYV seeds by 1970–71, the highest level of schooling attainment of any adult man and adult woman in the household,
the amount of owned land, and variables indicating residence in a
district with a government program designed to facilitate the adoption of the new seeds, the Intensive Agricultural District Program
(IADP), or a village with an extension program. The highest schooling level is divided into two categories: primary schooling and literacy. The logit estimates reported in column 1 replicate the finding
in Foster and Rosenzweig that when land size, farm equipment, and
irrigation facilities were controlled for, farm households containing
at least one adult who had completed primary schooling were significantly more likely to have adopted the new seeds by 1970–71.
However, as shown in columns 2 and 3, having primary-schooled or
literate adult women in the household does not appear to significantly affect whether a household adopted the new technology.

women’s schooling

687
TABLE 2

Contributions of Male and Female Schooling and Literacy to HYV
Profitability: Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variable Estimates, 1969–71
Variable

(1)

(2)

HYV area planted

⫺.145
(.78)
.277
(2.54)
⋅⋅⋅

⫺.144
(.77)
.262
(2.14)
⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

.0393
(.24)
⋅⋅⋅

HYV ⫻ any adult male with primary
schooling
HYV ⫻ any adult male literate
HYV ⫻ any adult female with primary
schooling
HYV ⫻ any adult female literate
Farm equipment value
Irrigation equipment value
Adverse village weather

⋅⋅⋅
6.00
(2.72)
.199
(.29)
⫺405.1
(2.22)

5.93
(2.73)
.211
(.26)
⫺402.1
(2.23)

(3)
⫺.0306
(.14)
.303
(2.18)
⫺.0972
(.61)
.234
(.98)
⫺.241
(1.13)
5.97
(2.73)
.480
(.53)
⫺415.7
(2.25)

Note.—The number of farm households is 1,756. Absolute values of robust t-ratios are in parentheses.

The data also indicate that the schooling of women did not contribute to the efficient use of the new seeds once adopted, in contrast
to the schooling of men. Table 2 reports results, based on a methodology similar to that used in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), from
the ARIS panel data that relate the profitability of HYV seeds to the
maximum schooling of adult men and women in the household
among farm households that had adopted the new seeds in the
1969–70 and 1970–71 crop years. The estimation procedure exploits
the panel dimension of the data to eliminate the influence of fixed,
household-level unmeasured attributes such as land quality and
farmer skills as well as lagged shocks to profitability by differencing
across years and instrumenting the differenced variables. In this interactive specification, the differential effects of the planting (acreage) of HYV seeds on farm profits by male and female schooling are
identified. The results indicate that HYV profitability was significantly higher in farm households in which at least one adult male
had completed primary schooling, as found in Rosenzweig (1995),
but HYV profitability was evidently no higher in households in which
any adult women had completed primary schooling or were literate
given male schooling.
The results from tables 1 and 2 indicate that female schooling
played a minimal role in the agricultural production sector even during the green revolution, although such effects were evident for
male schooling. It is possible, however, that female schooling impor-

688

journal of political economy

Fig. 1.—Percentage married farm women and men working for nonagricultural
wages or salaries: 1970–71 and 1981–82.

tantly contributed to household income and to the bargaining position of married women through the nonagricultural sector. It appears, however, that there was only a limited increase in the
participation of women in the nonagricultural wage and salary sector
in which schooling-augmented skills are potentially rewarded, and
no increase for literate women. Figure 1 displays nonagricultural sector participation rates in 1970–71 and 1981–82 for married adult
men and women in farm households for three schooling groups:
illiterate, literate, and completed primary schooling. As can be seen,
in 1970–71 less than 3 percent of married farm women participated
in this sector in all schooling groups, with no discernible pattern
by schooling. In contrast, there is a positive relationship between
schooling level and nonagricultural work participation by farm men
in the same year, with the participation rate of primary-schooled
men in the nonagricultural sector 40 percent higher than that of
literate men and almost five times higher than that of women who
were primary school graduates. In 1981–82, schooling level and nonagricultural labor force participation are positively related for both
farm men and women, with women who are primary school graduates having almost twice the participation rate of women who are
only literate, although in this later period less than 5 percent of farm
women who are primary school graduates are working outside of
agriculture.
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Fig. 2.—Literacy rates of farm newlyweds, by sex and date of marriage: 1962–81

The data thus suggest that while the green revolution enhanced
the value of men’s schooling in farm production and was associated
with increased participation by men residing in farm households in
nonagricultural employment, the contribution of women’s schooling to household income from the farming sector or from the rural
nonagricultural sector remained minimal. If there were no other
contribution of women’s schooling, we would expect a widening of
the gap between male and female schooling attainment subsequent
to the arrival of a steady stream of new, more productive seeds that
evidently raised the return to male schooling. However, despite the
absence of any significant increase in returns to female schooling
or literacy in the labor market caused by the green revolution, rates
of both female literacy and male literacy rose in rough parallel after
the onset of the green revolution.
The marriage histories provided in the 1970–71 ARIS and 1981–
82 REDS data permit the construction of aggregate time-series data
on the schooling of newlywed men and women in farm households,
men at approximately age 25 and women at age 20, prior to and
after the start of the green revolution. Figure 2 displays by quinquennia from 1962–66 through 1977–81 the literacy rates of newly married men and women in farm households for all of India, except the
state of Assam, based on the retrospective marriage histories merged
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from the two data sets. The graph indicates that the rate of young
farm men’s literacy rose from 51 percent to 63 percent whereas that
of their brides rose from 28 percent to 41 percent between the 1962–
66 and 1977–81 quinquennia. Brides’ literacy remained essentially
unchanged between the 1962–66 and 1967–71 period but rose by
almost a third by 1972–76 and continued to rise in the next 5 years
by about 10 percent. Thus, despite the almost 25 percent increase
in literacy rates in the 15-year period after the onset of the green
revolution for young farm men and the evident absence of any increases in the market returns to female schooling, the gap between
bride and groom literacy rates in farm households remained roughly
constant at about 22 percentage points.

III.
A.

Theoretical Framework
Maternal Schooling, Household Bargaining,
and Household Production

To provide a framework for assessing the extent to which, if at all,
the increase in female schooling attainment in an environment of
technical progress but low participation of women in earnings activities reflects the increased home productivity of female schooling, we
formulate a model incorporating home productivity of schooling
and household bargaining. We initially assume that each family in
the economy is exogenously formed and composed of two parents,
the mother and father, and a single child. Each parent cares about
his or her own private consumption as well as a child good. In particular, the utility for each parent i in family j is
u i(c ij , z j ) ⫽ ln(c ij ) ⫹ η i z j ,

(1)

where c ij denotes private goods consumption by parent i in j ; i ⫽ M,
F for mother and father, respectively; and z j denotes the level of
the composite child good. Note that preferences for the child good,
captured by η i , may differ between men and women.2 The child
good is produced according to a production function z that has
as inputs the level of human capital h j of the child and the level of
market goods x j provided to the child:
z j ⫽ z(h j , x j ).

(2)

2
Preferences for the child good may also differ among men and women. We defer
the discussion of the implications of preference heterogeneity for identifying the
effects of parental schooling on child schooling to Sec. V below.
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We assume that maternal time, child time, and school goods are
perfect complements in the production of human capital, with the
father playing a negligible part in home production:
h j ⫽ min[exp(φ H h Mj )H Mj , H j , b j ],

(3)

where H Mj is the own time of the mother in household j devoted to
child human capital production, H j is the time of the child spent in
his or her own human capital production, and b j denotes school
goods purchased in the market such as books and supplies as well
as school fees. Equation (3) incorporates the possibility that the efficiency of maternal time in the production of human capital depends on her level of schooling h ij , where φ H reflects the home productivity of maternal schooling. For simplicity we assume that
children, mothers, and fathers work up to T units of time, with wages
per unit of time of w c, w M, and w F. Consistent with the data, we also
assume that women as well as children work in earnings activities
that do not reward schooling.
We characterize the programming problem in terms of optimization by the father, who maximizes his own utility, given by (1), subject to (2), (3), and the budget constraint, which incorporates the
additional constraint that he must provide his wife a given level of
utility v Mj ⫽ v M(h Mj ):
p x x j ⫹ p cM c M* (z j , v Mj ) ⫹ p cF c Fj ⫹ ω j h j
⫽ R j ⫹ T[w F(h Fj ) ⫹ w M ⫹ w c ],

(4)

where, given (1), c *M(z j , v Mj ) ⫽ exp(v Mj ⫺ η Mz j ) is the minimum level
of private consumption that must be provided to the mother so that
she achieves her reservation utility v Mj for some given level of the
child good z j ; ω j ⫽ w M exp(⫺φ H h Mj ) ⫹ w c ⫹ p b is the minimized cost
to the household of producing each unit of human capital for the
child; and R j is nonearnings income.
The first-order condition for the father’s problem with respect to
the schooling of the child is
ηF

∂z j
∂h j

冢

⫽ λ ω j ⫺ p cM η M c *M

∂z j

冣

∂h j

,

(5)

where λ is the father’s marginal utility of income. This expression
indicates that the shadow price of a son’s schooling is affected by
the opportunity cost of the child’s and mother’s time as reflected
in ω j . In addition, the marginal cost of child schooling is influenced
by the bargaining position of the mother, as determined by her reservation utility and her preferences. The effect of an increase in ma-
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ternal schooling on the education of the child reflects its effects on
both maternal productivity and maternal ‘‘bargaining power’’:
∂h j
∂h Mj

⫽ φ Hw M exp(⫺φ Hh Mj )
⫹ w M φ H (T ⫺ H Mj )

∂h cj
∂p b

∂h j
∂R j

⫹

(6)
∂v Mj
∂h Mj

冤

p cM

冢

冣 冥

c Mj η M
∂h
⫺1
,
c Fj η F
∂p c F
c
j

where the superscript c denotes a compensated effect (i.e., both husband’s and wife’s utility held constant). Equation (6) has two components: the first two terms are the standard substitution and income
effects, respectively, that arise only in the presence of a home schooling productivity effect φ H. The second part reflects the necessity of
providing the wife her reservation utility—the bargaining effect. It
can be seen from (6) that if higher levels of maternal schooling are
associated with higher reservation utilities for women, then the sign
of the bargaining term depends on the relative preferences of men
and women for the child good z, that is, on the ratio η M /η F .3
Expression (6) makes clear that it is difficult to identify the home
productivity effect φ H from the association between a mother’s and
her child’s schooling, even in a setting in which mother’s schooling
does not contribute to household earnings, because that relationship may also reflect the effect on maternal bargaining power (given
asymmetric preferences between men and women). It is possible,
however, to draw inferences about home productivity and bargaining power effects of maternal schooling by examining the demand for wives’ schooling in the marriage market. To examine these
issues, we extend the model to two stages and add a marriage market
and an agricultural production sector.
At the beginning of the first stage, each adult male is assumed to
choose a spouse and to have two children, one of each sex. He then
chooses the allocation of time across activities and private good consumption for himself and his spouse and time allocation for his two
children subject to (i) time and budget constraints and (ii) the reservation utility requirement for his wife. In the second stage he marries
off his daughter and allocates his and his wife’s time and that of his
3
Expression (6) shows that the usual assumption (e.g., Thomas 1990) that a
greater claim by the mother on household resources tends to result in greater child
schooling requires asymmetric preferences, and in particular that η M /η F ⬎ 0. For
η M ⫽ η F , in which case preferences exhibit transferable utility, the schooling of the
child is invariant to changes in either the relative well-being or bargaining power
of the two parents. This is a standard implication of transferable utility in the presence of household public goods (see Bergstrom 1997).
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grown son, providing both his son and wife with sufficient consumption to keep the household intact.
The household is assumed to own a farm asset A j . Farm profitability depends on the level of technology θ and on the speed with which
technology is changing. As established in Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996), the effect of technological change τ on profitability is assumed to be influenced by the maximum schooling within the
household, h max
, as would be expected if the more schooled individui
als in a given household have a particular advantage in the management and adoption of new agricultural techniques and there is no
market for these entrepreneurial activities. Under these conditions,
, θ, τ), with ∂π/∂τ∂h
agricultural profits given A j are π j ⫽ π(A j , h max
j
⬎ 0.
In the first stage, children have no human capital, and, by assumption, the father has at least as much schooling as the wife.4 In the
second stage, the son and daughter have completed their schooling
and the daughter has been married out. Marriage by the daughter
has resulted in a net marital payment (dowry) of δ G that depends
on her level of human capital and conditions in the marriage market. Also the son must be provided a level of consumption sufficient
to keep him from setting up a separate household.
Given the patrilocal setup in which boys remain on the farm and
wives are imported to (daughters exported from) the local area,
locality-specific technological change increases the return to schooling of boys, but not of girls, if agricultural technological change and
men’s schooling are complements and women do not participate in
farm decision making. However, if women’s schooling increases
their home productivity in the production of human capital or increases their bargaining position in the household, then the effect
of technical change will increase the demand for maternal schooling
in the marriage market as long as technical change increases the
demand for the schooling of boys.5 In particular, if for simplicity we
assume that there is only one child, a son, in the household,
∂h Mj
∂τ

冢 冣

⫺
⫽

∂h *Bj
∂τ

φ H exp(⫺φ H h Mj ) ⫺ p cM η M c Mj
Ψ

冢 冣

∂v Mj dz *j
∂h Mj

dτ

,

(7)

4
In our data, wife’s schooling exceeds husband’s schooling in only 3 percent of
the cases.
5
This will be true if an increase in the speed of technical change raises farm profits
more than it raises the son’s income claim and this differential is increasing in child
schooling. This follows if there are constant returns to scale in production, the son
in autarchy faces the same technology as the father, and the son’s schooling exceeds
the father’s.
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where Ψ is the derivative of the first-order condition for maternal
schooling with respect to h Mj , with Ψ ⬍ 0 for an interior maximum,
and ∂h*Bj /∂τ is the derivative of the son’s schooling with respect to
technical change conditional on maternal schooling. Note that, in
contrast to the relationship between child and maternal schooling
in (6), the sign of the bargaining power effect of technical change on
the demand for maternal schooling is not dependent on the relative
magnitudes of husbands’ and wives’ preferences for the child good:
it is always positive.6

IV. The Demand for Schooled Wives
We now use the ARIS-REDS data to test the implications of the
model in which maternal schooling plays a productive role in the
home in facilitating the education of children. The first implication
we test, suggested by expression (7), is that the demand for maternal
schooling should increase in high–technical change areas for given
levels of men’s schooling, even in the absence of any increased labor
market return to women’s schooling, if women’s schooling facilitates
the production of child education and there is an increase in the
returns to and therefore the demand for men’s schooling in such
areas. The ARIS and REDS marital histories can be used to construct
a time series on the schooling of newlyweds at the village level that
can be used to assess whether the schooling of brides in high–technical change areas, for given schooling of young men, rose more than
the schooling of brides marrying in slow-growth areas. Note that
given the spatial differentials in the productivity-enhancing effects
of the availability of new seeds caused by differences in agroclimatic
conditions, the schooling of brides is a more sensitive and immediate
indicator of changes in the locale-specific demand for female
schooling than that of grooms given the common practice of village
exogamy: while it is not possible to instantaneously increase adult
male or female schooling attainment in response to perceived increases in schooling returns in any locality, the schooling attainment
of brides can be increased quickly in an area by importing educated
women from other areas (with presumably lower rates of technical
change).
6
This follows from the fact that with technological change, men will demand
higher levels of schooling for their children for any given level of maternal schooling. As child schooling also is valued by the wife, this implies that at higher levels
of technical change the incremental private good consumption required to compen* /∂z j ∂v Mj ⫽
sate a woman with incrementally higher reservation utility is lower (∂ 2c Mj
* ⬍ 0) in high–technical change areas.
⫺η Mc Mj
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The equation we estimate is
h Mjt ⫽

冱βS
k

jkt

⫹ β θ θ jt ⫹ β τ τ jt ⫹ µ j ⫹ v jt ,

(8)

k

where h Mjt is the schooling of a bride in village j at time t ; the S jkt are
family composition variables, such as the age and schooling composition of the groom’s household and the groom’s age and schooling;
θ jt is the level of agricultural technology in j at time t; τ jt is technical
change at t in j ; µ j captures time-invariant village characteristics such
as land quality, soil and weather conditions, marriage customs, and
groom preferences; the v jt are independently and identically distributed errors; and the β’s are coefficients.
We assume, as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), that technology
shocks are autocorrelated. In particular, we assume that technical
change in village j at time t, τ jt ⫽ θ jt ⫺ θ jt⫺1 , exhibits first-order autocorrelation: τ jt ⫽ ρτ jt⫺1 ⫹ ⑀ jt . With ρ ⬎ 0, this expression captures in
a relatively simple way the notion that areas that are well suited to
the adoption of new seeds in one period are also likely to be well
suited to the adoption of seeds that become available in subsequent
periods. This structure is consistent with the evidence that in the
Indian green revolution, areas benefiting from early growth exhibited more rapid growth in subsequent periods.
It is difficult to measure θ jt and τ jt , in particular, to distinguish in
the cross section between the level of technology and local fixed
endowments in an area, as reflected in µ j . However, the ARIS panel
data can be used as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) to estimate
area-specific measures of technical change τ jt for the initial green
revolution period 1968–71 by estimating in first differences and thus
eliminating the influence of µ j and time-invariant components of
local agricultural technology, a conditional, farm-level profit function incorporating village dummy variables and individual farm
assets, inclusive of schooling. The coefficients on the village dummy
variables measure village-specific differences in profit growth rates
net of changes in farm assets, that is, the τ jt , for the period 1968–
71.
To obtain estimates of the determinants of the schooling of brides,
we use data describing newlyweds’ schooling and farm household
characteristics for 227 villages for which we could estimate the τ jt
for the first three quinquennia depicted in figure 2. If there was
no significant technical change in the pre–green revolution period
1962–66 and the profit function estimates from the ARIS panel provide τ jt for the first green revolution period (1967–71), then in first
differences (8) becomes
β k DS jkt ⫹ D γ t τ j0 ⫹ Dv jt ,
(9)
Dh Mjt ⫽

冱
k
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where D is the first-difference operator, τ j0 is the village-level measure of technical change in 1967–71, and γ 62–66 ⫽ 0, γ 67–71 ⫽ β θ ⫹ β τ ,
and γ 72–76 ⫽ β θ(1 ⫹ ρ) ⫹ β τ ρ, given the autocorrelated technology
structure. By estimating (9), we can eliminate the influence of the
fixed factor µ j and the pre–green revolution technology and still
identify whether the effect of technological change on bride’s
schooling is positive (β τ ⬎ 0), whatever the value of the technology
level effect β θ , given positive autocorrelation in technology shocks,
if γ 67–71 ⬎ γ 72–76 . Indeed, if the effect of the level of technology on
the demand for schooled wives β θ is negligible, the autocorrelation
coefficient ρ is identified from the ratio of the two period-specific
τ coefficients. However, because brides become mothers, shocks to
wives’ schooling in an earlier period may influence the characteristics of grooms and the groom’s household composition contained
in the S jkt in a subsequent period. To eliminate the covariance between the differenced family variables and the lagged errors contained in Dv jt , we apply instrumental variables to (9), where the differenced family state variables from the prior level serve as
instruments. They include the household head’s literacy and age
and the total numbers of married women, literate married women,
men, and literate men, which should be uncorrelated with subsequent shock differences (e.g., changes in weather) that appear
in (9).
Table 3 reports the fixed-effects instrumental variable estimates of
the determinants of wives’ schooling based on the aggregate village
quinquennial time series. We use three categories of wives’ schooling—literate, literate without completion of primary schooling, and
completed primary schooling—and two categories for the groom’s
schooling—literate and completed primary schooling. Also included in the specification, besides the technical change measure
and the schooling and age at marriage of the groom, are variables
that measure the importing groom’s current household composition, including the total number of adult men and married women
and the number of literate men and married women. The combined
technology change and level effect on the demand for literate wives
is statistically significant (.05 level, one-tailed) and positive in all
specifications. The point estimates from column 2, where both
period-specific technical change parameter estimates are significantly greater than zero at the .05 level, indicate that γ 67–71 ⬎ γ 72–76 ,
which implies that β τ ⬎ 0 as long as technical change is positively
autocorrelated (and ρ ⫽ .55 if β θ ⫽ 0). An interesting feature of
table 3 is that, across the three columns, the differences in the τ
coefficient estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that there is
a greater demand for literate, but not primary-schooled, wives in
high-τ areas, given the schooling attainment of the groom.

TABLE 3

Note.—Absolute values of robust t-ratios are in parentheses.
* Endogenous variable.

Average number of literate, married women in the household*

Average number of married women in the household*

Average number of literate men in the household*

Average number of men in the household*

γ 72–76

γ 67–71

Average age of new husbands at marriage*

Proportion of new husbands literate*

Proportion of new husbands completed primary schooling*

Variable
.276
(2.26)
⫺.0069
(.04)
.0174
(1.86)
.0000430
(1.76)
.0000368
(1.40)
⫺.817
(1.07)
1.95
(1.43)
.453
(1.40)
⫺1.70
(1.22)

Proportion of New
Wives Literate
(1)

Proportion of New
Wives Completed
Primary Schooling
(3)
.282
(3.30)
⫺.118
(1.98)
⫺.00137
(.25)
.0000055
(.36)
.0000016
(.09)
.431
(1.00)
.244
(.25)
.163
(.57)
⫺.164
(.21)

Proportion of New
Wives Literate but Not
Primary School Graduates
(2)
⫺.00829
(.10)
.240
(1.96)
.0141
(1.71)
.0000361
(1.67)
.0000198
(1.71)
⫺.541
(1.67)
⫺.440
(.57)
.0164
(.08)
.657
(1.16)

Quinquennial Village Observations: Determinants of the Schooling and Literacy of Newly Married Farm Wives, 1961–76
(Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variable Estimates)
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V. Mother’s Schooling and Children’s
Study Hours
The evident absence of any significant rise in the returns to women’s
literacy in the labor market after the onset of the green revolution
suggests that the increase in demand for schooled (literate) wives
in high-growth areas, net of the effects of the rising schooling levels
of men, indicated in table 3 may reflect the existence of increased
returns to the schooling of women in the household sector. In this
section we directly examine the relationship between maternal
schooling and the time allocation of children and mothers in the
household to assess whether, in particular, maternal literacy plays a
productive role in the schooling of children. The REDS data provide
information on time allocation—hours per day in three seasons of
the crop year 1981–82 for ‘‘typical’’ days in those seasons—for
women and children in 11 categories, one of which is study hours
(including time in school and homework).
As noted, a striking feature of the estimates in table 3 is that the
demand for literate wives increased relative to the demand for wives
who either were illiterate or had higher levels of schooling in highτ villages. One plausible way in which mothers may aid in children’s
schooling is to help with homework, where a mother’s ability to read
and write is essential but higher schooling levels may be less important. Indeed, the REDS data on the study hours of children in farm
households also indicate the special importance of maternal literacy.
Figure 3 presents the average number of study hours per day (averaged over the three seasons) for school-age farm children aged 7–
14 by three levels of mother’s schooling and for fathers who either
are literate or have completed primary school.7 These graphs suggest
two patterns: first, whether fathers have completed primary school
or are just literate does not appear to matter much for children’s
study hours. Second, farm children with mothers who are literate
but have not completed their primary schooling study almost one
hour more per day than children with illiterate mothers and slightly
less than one hour more per day than children with mothers who
have completed primary school. This nonlinear pattern with respect
to children’s study habits is consistent with the nonlinear demand
for schooled wives, for which literacy appeared to have the highest
marriage market premium.
Examination of the time allocation of the mothers also reveals
nonlinear relationships with respect to their schooling level that ap7
Only 7.2 percent of all illiterate male farmers who are also fathers were married
to a woman who had any schooling. More than two-thirds of male farmer-fathers
are at least literate.
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Fig. 3.—Average study hours per day among farm children, by schooling level of
mother and father.

pear consistent with a complementary relationship between literacy,
but not higher levels of schooling, and maternal child development.
There are three time allocation categories in the data that characterize the mother’s nonmarket time: (i) ‘‘home care,’’ which includes
child care, cooking, and cleaning; (ii) ‘‘domestic production,’’
which includes grinding and pounding grain, collecting fuel, and
fetching water; and (iii) ‘‘leisure,’’ which includes sleeping and bathing. Figure 4 depicts the average hours per day in which married
farm women spend their nonleisure time for the three schooling
classes. As can be seen, there is an inverted U–shaped relationship
for the principal time allocation category ‘‘home care’’: married,
literate farm women who are not primary school graduates evidently
spend 1.5 hours more per day in home care than illiterate women
and about one hour more than women who are primary school graduates. As a consequence, literate, nongraduate women on net spend
less time in other combined work activities than either illiterate
women or women who are graduates. In particular, literate, married
farm women spend less time in both domestic production and offfarm salary and wage work than other married farm women, although, on average, such women spend more time than primaryschool graduates in very small amounts of on-farm work. These time
allocation data thus confirm our earlier findings that, unless literate
women are more productive than primary school graduates in non–
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Fig. 4.—Time allocation of married farm women, by literacy and schooling: average hours per day in 1981–82.

home care activities, it is unlikely that the enhanced marriage market demand for literate wives reflects their greater contribution to
household income.
Figures 3 and 4 may be misleading as evidence of a productive
role for maternal schooling in schooling production in the home,
even in the context in which off-farm market work is relatively unimportant, for a number of reasons. First, the schooling level of the
mother may simply reflect the preferences of the father for his children’s schooling; maternal schooling is endogenous in the model,
and its demand has as a determinant η F , which is positively related
to both the mother’s and the child’s schooling, conditional on the
mother’s schooling. Second, preferences may be intergenerationally
correlated, so that the schooling preferences of the father for his
children may be correlated with his own schooling, which was determined in the same household. Third, the schooling of the wife (and
the husband) may be related to wealth levels, which may also directly
affect child schooling as well as maternal work patterns.8
To see the problem for estimation of the existence of correlated
household preferences within the male’s household, assume that the
intergenerational transmission of the child preference parameter
8
There may also be a relationship between a mother’s schooling and the age of
her children, which is highly correlated with schooling.
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within the family of the father η F is characterized by a random walk.
Then the preference parameter η Fij for the ith father in family j is
η Fij ⫽ η j ⫹ η*Fij , where η j is the preference parameter for family j and
η*Fij is the independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic
(across individual fathers in j ) component to i ’s preferences.
The linearized demand equation for the schooling of the child in
the family of father i in family j is
h ij ⫽ α F h Fij ⫹ α M h Mij ⫹ α A A ij ⫹ α θθ j ⫹ α τ τ j ⫹ η Fij ⫹ κ j ⫹ e ij ,

(10)

where the α k are coefficients, κ j captures all household attributes,
and e ij is a father-specific random error. Given the random walk assumption, a father ij ’s own preferences will be correlated with his
schooling h Fij since his schooling is a function of his parents’ preferences, which are correlated with his own. In addition, of course, his
preferences will be correlated with his wife’s schooling h Mij , which
is chosen by him in the marriage market. Because the preference
parameters are unmeasured, estimation of (10) will yield biased and
inconsistent estimates of the schooling effects coefficients.
We can exploit the fact that many farm households in India are
extended and eliminate the influence of own father’s preferences
on own schooling (as well as the effects of local technology and its
change) by differencing across coresident fathers (sons or brothers
of the household head) in the same family, resulting in
Dh ij ⫽ α M Dh Mij ⫹ α F Dh Fij ⫹ α A DA ij ⫹ D η*Fij ⫹ De ij ,

(11)
9

where D is the difference operator for fathers within a family j. Equation (11) now contains in the residual only the idiosyncratic components η*Fij of fathers’ preferences, which by assumption are not correlated with own schooling. As indicated in the model, these
preference components are, however, correlated with wives’ schooling h Mij via the marriage market. One method of eliminating this
correlation is to use instruments that will predict wives’ completed
schooling and are not correlated with children’s contemporaneous
schooling investments. One set of candidates consists of variables
known at the time of the father’s marriage that affected his choice
of a marital partner. An important example is technical change in
the local area that was experienced prior to the marriage, that varies
across areas, and that, from table 3, affects the mate-schooling
choice of grooms. Because current values of τ j that affect current
9
A sample of extended families is not a random sample of all households. Such
households, e.g., might have different preferences for joint living, which could be
correlated with schooling preferences. Differencing across subfamilies within an extended household eliminates any common preferences or unobserved costs of coresidence that are household-specific.
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schooling choices are eliminated from (11), prior values of τ j at the
time of marriage are valid instruments and vary across fathers because of differences in their years of birth and thus when they married. We create dummy variables representing three periods of technical change: years prior to the onset of the green revolution (before
1966), the immediate post–green revolution period 1967–71, and
the subsequent period 1972–76 (all fathers with children over age
6 in 1982 married prior to 1976). The instruments for Dh Mij in (11)
are then interactions between village dummies and one of the three
technical change interval dummies corresponding to the period in
which the father reached age 24, the mean age at marriage for men
in the sample.
In addition to variables characterizing the father’s and mother’s
schooling, in the three categories, we also include in the specification of child study hours the age and sex of the child as well as the
child’s years of schooling completed prior to the current year. The
latter variable is included because the dependent variable is a flow
measure of schooling, which will depend on the child’s accumulated
stock of human capital. A child’s achieved schooling is also likely to
be correlated with the parental preferences, however. We therefore
also treat this state variable as endogenous, using as instruments interactions between village dummy variables and the year in which
the child was born. These variables reflect the local history of technical change and school access experienced by children born in different years that should have influenced their prior schooling investments.
Finally, we include total household wealth in the specification and
a variable characterizing whether the child’s father is a son of the
household head or the head’s brother. Because a father’s relationship to the head, given partible inheritance rules, affects his claim
on household assets, the variable may pick up his bargaining power
within the extended household. For example, a coresident brother
of the head has a contemporaneous claim on the household’s assets
that is equal to that of the designated household head and is thus
a primary claimant, whereas a son of the head has a claim on his
father’s asset share only at his father’s (head’s) death. Because
changes in total household wealth may therefore have different effects depending on familial asset claims, we also interact household
wealth with the relationship variable.
Column 1 of table 4 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the determinants of average study hours per day. This specification also includes a measure of the district-level technical change
for the period 1970–71 through 1981–82, from Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), and the household’s total wealth, all of which are

Note.—Absolute values of robust t-ratios are in parentheses.
* Endogenous variable.

Number of children
Households

Constant

τ 71–82

Household wealth (⫻10 )

⫺3

Primary claimant ⫻ household wealth (⫻10⫺3)

Father primary claimant

Child is girl

Child’s age

Child’s years of schooling*

Father completed primary school

Father literate

Mother completed primary school*

Mother literate*

Variable/Estimator
1.03
(5.29)
.0581
(.25)
.260
(1.42)
.706
(3.83)
.812
(34.1)
⫺.420
(21.1)
⫺.621
(6.81)
.054
(.36)
.000959
(.81)
.000564
(.57)
.0291
(3.13)
6.39
(25.4)
5,595
2,473

All
Households:
OLS
(1)
1.42
(3.16)
⫺.029
(.08)
.460
(1.08)
⫺.567
(1.21)
.891
(15.8)
⫺.462
(9.97)
⫺.163
(.79)
.270
(.65)
.00529
(1.87)
⫺.000721
(.51)
.060
(2.95)
6.73
(12.29)
938
262

OLS
(2)

938
262

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅
938
262

⋅⋅⋅

1.78
(2.02)
⫺1.05
(.91)
.339
(.68)
.0217
(.05)
.721
(7.39)
⫺.382
(5.46)
⫺.487
(2.29)
⫺1.23
(1.99)
.00868
(1.98)
⋅⋅⋅

WithinHousehold IV
(4)

⋅⋅⋅

1.04
(2.21)
⫺.756
(1.36)
.458
(.94)
.0136
(.03)
.626
(11.5)
⫺.327
(6.48)
⫺.596
(3.01)
⫺1.41
(2.35)
.00863
(1.98)
⋅⋅⋅

WithinHousehold
(3)

Extended-Household Sample

Determinants of Farm Children’s Average Daily Study Hours in 1981–82

TABLE 4

561
172

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

2.38
(1.69)
⫺1.29
(.78)
⫺.632
(.73)
.361
(.44)
.593
(4.89)
⫺.330
(3.83)
⫺.711
(2.67)
⋅⋅⋅

Son
Sample:
WithinHousehold IV
(5)
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otherwise impounded in the household fixed effect in subsequent
columns. The sample consists of all farm households with children
aged 7–14. Because there are multiple subfamilies within a substantial portion of the households, coefficient standard errors are corrected for arbitrary within-household error correlations. The OLS
estimates indicate, again, that children with literate mothers spend,
on average, one hour more per day in study than other children of
the same age, sex, and prior schooling with mothers who are not
literate. Moreover, children of mothers who both are literate and
have completed primary schooling study no more hours than the
children whose mothers are literate but are not graduates of primary
school. The OLS estimates also suggest, however, that whether or
not the child’s father completed primary school also affects study
habits: children with such fathers spend 0.7 hour more per day in
study, an estimate that is also statistically significant.
In column 2 we report OLS estimates from the sample of households that have two or more mothers with school-age children.
These estimates are generally similar to those obtained from the
full sample of households, indicating that sample selection by number of subhouseholds is not very important. The only striking difference is the coefficient on the father’s primary schooling, which is
neither positive nor significant in the extended sample but is positive and significant in the full sample. This change is consistent
with household income’s dependence on the maximum schooling
of household males, since the effect will be zero for males in extended households with less than maximum schooling. The withinhousehold (cross-mother) estimates eliminate the family component of father’s schooling preferences that is potentially correlated
with the father’s own schooling and the common contribution of
each parent’s schooling to child outcomes in the extended households inclusive of the maximum schooling effect. As can be seen,
eliminating the correlation with father’s preferences lowers the estimate of the maternal literacy effect, consistent with the model. The
coefficient is still statistically significant, indicating that children with
literate mothers spend one hour more per day in study. The schooling coefficients for the father are not jointly significant by conventional standards in this specification.
When the endogeneity of the mother’s schooling and child’s
schooling from mate choice and prior household investments, respectively, are also taken into account, the influence of the schooling
of the father on children’s allocation of time to study is reduced still
further, whereas that of the literacy of the mother is augmented and
is statistically significant. The within-household instrumental variable estimates, reported in column 3, still indicate a nonlinear pat-
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tern for maternal schooling and little role for paternal schooling.
The point estimates suggest that the children of literate mothers
devote 1.8 hours more to study than otherwise identical children of
illiterate mothers in the same household and 1.1 hours more than
similar children with mothers who are primary school graduates, although the latter estimate is not statistically different from zero. One
possible reason for the marginally significant decrease in study time
for the children of primary-schooled relative to literate women is
that primary-schooled women are devoting more of their time to
activities in which schooling has a return, such as in nonagricultural
employment as shown in figure 1. In contrast, children with literate
fathers spend only a statistically insignificant third of an hour more
in study than children with illiterate fathers and less than a few minutes more than that if the father has completed primary school.
To eliminate the possible influence of heterogeneous maternal
preferences, we also estimated (11) using only fathers who are sons
of the head (fathers with the same parents). The sample size is reduced to 172 households with 561 children. These estimates, reported in column 5 of table 4, are similar to those obtained using
all family members, although somewhat less precise, and a Hausman
test indicates nonrejection of the hypothesis that the set of withinhousehold and within-sibling instrumental variable estimates are
identical (χ 2(7) ⫽ 8.32).
The estimates of the relationship between maternal schooling and
maternal time allocation that take into account differences in paternal preferences and mate choice suggest that the association between maternal literacy and children’s study hours reflects what
mothers do in the home. The model implies that as long as maternal
time is an important input in the production of child schooling, the
effect of maternal schooling on child schooling and on her own time
devoted to child schooling will have the same sign if the own price
elasticity of demand for child schooling in the household is sufficiently large.
Columns 1–3 of table 5 present within-household instrumental
variable estimates of the determinants of the time allocated by farm
wives to home care, which is the only time allocation category that
includes child care. As in the estimates for the allocation of children’s time for study, the wife’s (mother’s) schooling variables are
treated as endogenous along with the average schooling attainment
(in years) of any children. The within-household estimates in column 1, obtained from farm households with at least two married
women, replicate the inverted U–shaped pattern for maternal
schooling and average home care hours seen in figure 4, with literate
farm wives spending 1.4 hours more in this activity than illiterate

TABLE 5

1.36
(2.89)
⫺.911
(1.68)
⫺.241
(.82)
.190
(.71)
.126
(.37)
⫺.0281
(2.10)
⫺.139
(2.06)
.00194
(1.88)
⫺.116
(1.62)
.372
(1.70)
.0782
(.27)
.0474
(.30)
.323
(1.43)
2,602

Note.—Absolute values of robust asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.
* Endogenous variable.

Number of wives

Any own children 7–14

Any own children 0–6

Proportion own children 7–14 male

Proportion own children 0–6 male

Average schooling attainment of children 7–14*

Wife’s age squared

Wife’s age

Primary claimant ⫻ household wealth

Husband primary wealth claimant

Husband completed primary school

Husband literate

Wife completed primary school*

Wife literate*

Coefficient

All Wives
(1)

.220
(.77)
1,452

1.96
(3.25)
⫺1.04
(1.50)
⫺.375
(1.02)
.152
(.45)
⫺.351
(.77)
⫺.0317
(1.38)
⫺.238
(2.16)
.00383
(2.20)
.0055
(.02)
.421
(1.67)
.103
(.34)
⋅⋅⋅

Wives with
Some Children
(2)

248

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

⋅⋅⋅

⫺.643
(.53)
.655
(.34)
⫺1.41
(1.19)
1.94
(1.83)
.890
(1.17)
⫺.0395
(1.28)
⫺.284
(1.69)
.00412
(1.53)
⋅⋅⋅

Wives with
No Children
(3)

Wife’s Average Daily Home Care Hours

13.6
(1.93)
1,452

15.1
(.89)
⫺28.1
(1.57)
⫺31.9
(2.47)
19.1
(1.69)
⫺5.19
(.48)
.000240
(3.20)
3.61
(.90)
⫺.0492
(.84)
1.47
(.46)
.567
(.08)
7.62
(.71)
⋅⋅⋅

Clothing
Expenditures
per Child: Wives
with Some Children
(4)

Determinants of Farm Wife’s Average Daily Home Care Hours and Household Clothing Expenditures per Child:
Within-Household Instrumental Variable Estimates, 1982
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wives and 0.9 hour more than primary-school graduate wives. These
differentials in time allocation by maternal schooling appear to be
related to child care since they are more pronounced for mothers
with children under 15 (col. 2). Indeed, among wives with no children under 15, there is no significant relationship between wives’
schooling and their average hours devoted to home care (col. 3).
The point estimates in columns 2 and 3 suggest that, within the same
household, literate mothers with similarly aged young children devote almost 2 hours more to home care than illiterate mothers. In
contrast, among wives with no young children in the household,
those who are literate appear to spend 0.6 hour less per day in home
care than their illiterate counterparts.
VI. Distinguishing between Bargaining and Home
Productivity Effects
The within-household instrumental variable estimates of table 4,
which indicate a pronounced role for maternal literacy in affecting
the study hours of children while taking into account the influence
of paternal schooling preferences, and the estimates in table 3 showing an increase in the demand for literate wives in high-τ areas despite the absence of any evident significant agricultural sector or
rural, nonagricultural return to female literacy are both consistent
with the theoretical predictions of the model in which maternal
schooling (literacy) plays a productive role in augmenting the human capital of children. It may still be possible that more schooled,
in this case literate, mothers have superior options outside of marriage that are not adequately measured by labor market returns in
the rural (or urban) sector, in which case, as was demonstrated, it
is not possible from those estimates to distinguish between productivity and bargaining or reservation utility interpretations of the role
of maternal schooling in the household sector.
In this section we carry out the two additional tests suggested by
the model that provide evidence on the productivity of maternal
schooling in producing human capital. One method of identifying
the existence of a productivity effect of maternal schooling in child
schooling investment when the effect of schooling on maternal bargaining power cannot be ruled out, with some added structure, is
to examine the effect of maternal schooling on child goods for
which there is no direct own productivity effect of maternal schooling. One example is child consumption x. The assumption that parents care about x only through its effect on the composite child good
z, along with the additional assumptions that the production of the
child z good is characterized by homotheticity, the human capital
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production function is constant returns to scale, and the children’s
financial returns to schooling are constant, imply that the difference
in the elasticities of child human capital and the child good with
respect to maternal schooling is
⑀ hB hM ⫺ ⑀ xhM ⫽ ⫺φ Hw M exp(⫺φ H h Mj )(⑀ chB p b ⫺ ⑀ cxp b ),

(12)

where ⑀ ij is the elasticity of i with respect to j and ⑀ cij is the corresponding compensated elasticity (we have again assumed for simplicity
that the couple has only a son). Because changes in the wife’s reservation utility have the same percentage effect on the demand for x
and the child schooling input under these assumptions, the elasticities of the two inputs with respect to maternal schooling will be equal
only if maternal schooling does not directly influence the cost (efficiency) of schooling production. Moreover, because the difference
in compensated elasticities on the right-hand side of (12) must be
negative, the left-hand side of (12) identifies the presence of a
home productivity effect φ H even if there are bargaining effects of
schooling.
In column 4 of table 5, we present within-household instrumental
variable estimates of the determinants of clothing expenditures per
child, using the sample of households with at least two mothers who
coreside with one or more children aged less than 15. The model
suggested that if a mother’s schooling improves only her bargaining
power, then given that women prefer child services more than men,
the elasticities of any child input, whether clothing or schooling,
with respect to maternal schooling should be equal. The estimates
in table 5, however, suggest that there is essentially no relationship
between maternal literacy and expenditures on children’s clothing:
literate mothers spend a statistically insignificant 15 rupees more
per year per child on their clothing, less than 5 percent of average
expenditures per child, than illiterate mothers. If mothers cared
more about children than fathers and literacy raised their ability to
influence household decisions, then we would have expected to see
maternal literacy to be significantly associated with this type of expenditures, given the marked effect of maternal literacy on their
hours in home (child) care and on their children’s hours in study.
It is also possible to test for the existence of a bargaining effect
by examining the pricing of schooled women in the marriage market. The model implies that, in the absence of market returns to
female schooling or of a productivity effect of maternal schooling
within the home, female schooling, by increasing women’s bargaining power, imposes a cost on men. In particular, if the maternal
schooling effect operates only by requiring an increase in transfers
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from the husband to the wife within marriage in order to meet the
reservation utility requirement, then an optimizing man would not
find it in his interest, ceteris paribus, to select a more educated wife.
To see this, we note that the first-order condition for the optimal
maternal schooling chosen by the man is
∂δ Mj h Mj
∂v Mj
*
⫺ p cM c Mj
⫽ 0, (13)
φ H (h Bj ⫹ h Gj ) exp(⫺φ H h Mj ) ⫹
∂h Mj
∂h Mj
where h Bj and h Gj are the human capital levels of the son and daughter determined in the first stage, and δ Mj is the dowry function. The
first term captures the effect of an increase in maternal schooling on
the shadow cost of child schooling, which will contribute positively
to the left-hand side of (13). The second term reflects the market
relationship between dowry and schooling. The final term captures
the effect of the wife’s schooling on her reservation utility and thus
on the level of her claim on private consumption in the household.
This term is negative where a woman’s schooling increases her bargaining power.
Expression (13) shows that, for a given dowry payment δ Mj and
with maternal schooling having no productivity benefits (φ H ⫽ 0),
the net value of maternal schooling to men is negative if schooling
has positive bargaining power effects for women in marriage that
do not arise from labor market productivity effects. That is, in the
presence of bargaining effects but not market or home productivity
effects of women’s schooling, men would require higher levels of
transfers (net dowry) to marry more schooled women. Bargaining
power effects would be manifested in a positive relationship between
net dowry and wife’s schooling. The presence of a negative female
schooling–dowry gradient where labor market schooling returns for
women are low, however, would suggest that the contribution of
women’s schooling to home production is positive.10
Neither the REDS nor the ARIS data provide information on
dowry. However, 1984 survey data from the households that participated in the Village Studies Surveys of the International Crops Research Institute of the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT) of India provide
dowry information as well as characteristics of marital partners and
their parents. The survey, undertaken in 10 villages in four districts
in the semiarid tropics of India, provides the dowry associated with
the marriages of the household heads and their daughters in each
of the 40 surveyed households in nine of the 10 villages, the school10
Indeed, where female schooling is unproductive in the home and in the market,
the dowry–female schooling gradient should exactly equal the marginal value of the
loss to the man’s utility from marrying a women with an additional year of schooling.
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ing of the head and wife, the schooling of the parents of the
head, and the landholdings of the head’s parents when the head
was age 15.
An interesting feature of the ICRISAT survey is that qualitative
information was ascertained on the principal reason why the dowry
associated with each of the head’s daughters differed from the average across daughters. There are 365 daughter marriages recorded
in the data. In 34.1 percent of them, schooling differences among
daughters were given as the reason for the dowry differential. The
next-highest category, property of the groom, was given in 32.7 percent of the responses, followed by the physical characteristics of the
daughter, in 8 percent of the responses. Thus the data indicate that,
among the respondents, schooling is a salient bride attribute determining dowry amounts. It is necessary, however, to estimate the
direction of the relationship between a bride’s schooling and her
dowry from the marriages of the heads of households since there is
no information on the actual schooling of daughters who married.
The data suggest that the ICRISAT survey area is not atypical of
rural India as a whole in the early 1980s with respect to the role of
women. Information on the occupation of family members indicates
that none of the wives of the heads participated in nonagricultural
wage or salary jobs, and schooling was not related to whether or not
a farm woman also carried out craft or trading activities. Moreover,
the relationships between parental schooling and, in this case, son’s
schooling are similar to those observed in the NCAER-REDS survey
data.11 The association between maternal literacy and son’s schooling does not appear to merely reflect improved maternal bargaining
power, since the information on the dowries associated with the
heads’ marriages suggests that female literacy is positively valued by
men despite the absence of a prominent nonhousehold role for female literacy. Table 6 presents within-village estimates of the determinants of dowries paid to the grooms’ families for farm households
in the nine villages with complete information and for marriages
taking place as early as 1940 and as late as the survey year, 1984. In
addition to the schooling of the husband and wife, the specification
includes in the three categories the owned dry and wet landholdings
11
Logit estimates of the determinants of the probability that a farm head had
completed primary school indicate that, as in the NCAER-REDS data, maternal literacy has the strongest relationship with the schooling attainment of the son: a son
with a literate mother has more than twice the probability of finishing primary school
than a head with average family characteristics does. The effect of the father’s literacy is one-third that of the mother, and the effect of his father’s having completed
primary school on the probability that the head completes primary school is essentially zero.
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TABLE 6

ICRISAT Data: Determinants of Dowry Paid to Husband’s Family
in Nine Villages, 1940–84
Variable
Dowry paid (1983 rupees)
Wife literate
Wife with primary schooling
Husband literate
Husband with primary schooling
Owned family dry land when husband aged 15 (acres)
Owned family irrigated land
when husband aged 15 (acres)
Father literate
Mother literate
Father with primary schooling
R2
Number of households (villages)

Mean
(Standard Deviation)

Village Fixed-Effects
Coefficient

6,455
(11,466)
.0502
(.219)
.0618
(.241)
.108
(.311)
.205
(.404)
12.5
(24.3)
1.19
(4.04)
.0849
(.279)
.0154
(.124)
.0618
(.241)
⋅⋅⋅
259 (9)

⋅⋅⋅
⫺4,816
(1.74)
⫺394
(.19)
25.8
(.01)
7,659
(3.04)
156
(3.57)
544
(2.36)
4,025
(1.03)
⫺4,177
(.76)
1,501
(.30)
.58
259 (9)

Note.—Absolute values of robust t-ratios are in parentheses.

of the husband’s family when he was age 15 and the schooling of
the husband’s parents.
The results reported in table 6 are consistent with the qualitative
survey data pertaining to daughters, which indicated a role for both
schooling and groom household resources, among the measured
variables, in determining dowry levels.12 The most striking feature
of the estimates in table 6 is the importance of female literacy and
the lack of importance of female primary schooling, which parallels
what was observed in both the relationship between technical
change and the demand for bride’s schooling and between maternal
schooling and children’s study hours. In particular, the estimates
indicate that men are willing to forgo a substantial amount of dowry
for a literate bride, almost three-fourths of the average dowry payment, but do not pay any additional premium for a bride who has
also completed primary school. In contrast, men with primary
schooling command a substantial premium in the ICRISAT area
12
Rao (1993) obtains similar results using these data based on a very different
specification. Schooling is not differentiated by level in that study, however.
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marriage market, but husbands who are merely literate are not valued. The importance of schooling, although at different levels, in
determining dowries is consistent with the qualitative survey data.
The fact that greater resources in the head’s family attract higher
dowries, with landholdings that are irrigated being valued at 3.5
times those that are not, is also consistent with these data. Finally,
the schooling of the head’s parents, given his own schooling and
land, does not have any effect on the dowry payment. The schooling
of parents was not mentioned by respondents as being important in
differentiating dowries.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the hypothesis that increases in the
schooling of women enhance the human capital of the next generation and thus make a unique contribution to economic growth. We
pay particular attention to whether and how educational opportunities for women in the labor market affect the relationship between
the schooling of mothers and school investments in children. On the
basis of a household model incorporating individual optimization,
differences in parental preferences for child schooling, a marriage
market, and a labor market, we established conditions under which
it is possible to evaluate the relative importance of earnings and bargaining effects of maternal schooling and thus the extent to which
any observed relationship between maternal and child schooling reflects the productivity of home teaching.
The framework is applied to data describing green revolution India, a setting that has a number of features that provide insights into
the precise mechanisms by which increases in female schooling are
manifested in augmented human capital investments in children. In
particular, because of relatively low levels of female nonagricultural
employment and evidently low levels of involvement of women in
management decisions in agriculture over the sample period studied, we are able to rule out important effects of female schooling
on earnings, particularly for women with less than primary schooling. This absence of labor market returns to schooling for women,
coupled with evidence of increased demand for literate women in
high–technical change areas, a significant effect of maternal literacy
on the study hours of children that is robust to variation in the
schooling preferences of fathers, lower dowries received on average
by men marrying literate women, and the absence of an effect of
maternal schooling on child clothing expenditures, indicates that
any bargaining effects, if present, also had a limited impact on
household decision making. Thus we conclude that at least some
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component of the significant and positive relationship between maternal literacy and child schooling in the Indian setting reflects the
effects of maternal schooling on the efficiency of maternal time in
the production of child human capital and that the existence of this
effect, combined with the increase in returns to schooling for men,
importantly underlies the expansion of female literacy following the
onset of the green revolution.
An important implication of our results is that increasing labor
market opportunities for women is not necessary to justify increased
investments in female schooling, which have payoffs even in settings
in which there is increased demand for schooling solely in maledominated occupations. It is important to recognize, however, that
our conclusions about the productive role of maternal schooling,
and in particular female literacy, in home teaching in India in this
period do not necessarily generalize to all times and places. Our
framework suggests that in other low-income areas in which female
participation in nonagricultural employment is high or women are
directly involved in farm management decisions, it is quite possible,
even likely, that a significant fraction of any relationship between
maternal schooling and child outcomes reflects both the earnings
contributions of educated women to the household and the implications of enhanced female earnings opportunities for the ability of
the mother to influence household decisions. Indeed, our approach
opens the question whether the substantial conformity in findings
in the vast empirical literature examining the effects of maternal
schooling on child outcomes is misleading in that it may obscure
substantial variability across settings in the underlying mechanisms,
differences that have important implications for the growth consequences of specific interventions targeting female education.
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